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Enforcing Conformity: Criminalising religiously inspired acts
Michael Quinlan *
“My son, if you aspire to serve the Lord prepare yourself for an ordeal.” 1

INTRODUCTION
On 10 April 2019 the High Court delivered its judgment in the Clubb case. 2 It found that
Tasmanian and Victorian exclusion zones did not offend the implied freedom of political
communication. 3 Both laws proscribe certain behaviours if they take place within a 150 metre
radius from premises which provide abortions. 4 The implied freedom of political
communication is a constraint on legislative power rather than a personal right. 5 Its application
involves a consideration of the relevant law’s effect on political communication as a whole
rather than a consideration of its impact on an individual. 6 Similar legislation to that considered
by the High Court operates in most of Australia’s states and territories. 7 This paper is not
concerned with the implied freedom. It is instead concerned with the impact of these laws on
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Law, Sydney, Acting Dean, School of Business, Sydney The University of Notre Dame Australia.
1

Sirach 2:1 Jerusalem Bible

2

Clubb v Edwards; Preston v Avery [2019] HCA 11 (10 April 2019) (‘Club v Edwards’).

3

Ibid.

4

Reproductive Health (Access to Terminations) Act 2013 (Tas) s 9(2) (‘Access to Terinations Act’); Public Health
and Wellbeing Act 2008 (Vic) s 185D (‘Wellbeing Act’).

5

Clubb v Edwards (n 2) [247].

6

Ibid.

7
Access to Terminations Act (n 4); Welbeing Act (n 4); Health Act 1993 (ACT) ss 85-87; Pregnancy Law
Reform Act 2017 (NT); Public Health Amendment (Safe Access To Reproductive Health Clinics) Act 2018
(NSW) (‘Safe Access Act’); Termination of Pregnancy Act 2018 (Qld). Such legislation has been proposed but
not, as yet, enacted in Western Australia; see The Greens, ‘Safe Zone Call For Abortion Clinics’ (Web Page, 15
February 2017) <https://greens.org.au/news/wa/safe-zone-call-abortion-clinics>; Caroline Winter “South
Australia lagging behind the nation in abortion laws”(Web Page, 20 April 2019)
<https://www.abc.net.au/radio/programs/am/south-australia-lagging-behind-the-nation-in-abortionlaws/11033174>.
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religiously inspired actions. It analyses the exclusion zone legislation against the obligations
undertaken by Australia under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) focusing on Article 18. Unlike the implied freedom of political communication
Article 18 (like most other Articles of the ICCPR) recognises the existence of personal rights. 8
Australia has been a party to the ICCPR since 1980 but it has not been domesticated into
Australian law. 9 Whilst the Ruddock Review into religious freedom in Australia did not
recommend that Australia take this step, it remains an option for the Federal Government. 10 In
the meantime Australia has an obligation under Article 2 of the ICCPR to ‘respect’ the rights
guaranteed by the ICCPR. 11 Whilst this paper will focus on Article 18, other provisions of the
ICCPR particularly Articles 19 and 21 are also mentioned as they are relevant to the protection
of religious freedom and may also be legislatively adopted in Australia.
The obligation to guarantee religious freedom is one with which many might agree in the
abstract. It is in areas of controversy, such as exclusion zone legislation, that support for this
fundamental freedom is particularly tested. This paper considers the effect of these laws which
criminalise certain religiously inspired actions. It then considers whether they are necessary
for any of the purposes identified in the relevant Articles of the ICCPR. This is an important
question, whether or not Australia decides to domesticate these Articles given that it has ratified
the ICCPR without relevant reservations. There are also good policy and other reasons for
Australia and its states and territories to seek to act in accordance with international law in their
domestic laws. 12

8

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess, Supp No 16,
UN Doc A/6316 (16 December 1966) (‘ICCPR’).

9

George Williams, ‘The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and responsibilities: Origins and Scope’ (2006) 30(3)
Melbourne University Law Review 892.

10
Philip Ruddock, ‘Report of the Expert Panel Religious Freedom Review’ (Report, 18 May 2018) 46-47
(‘Ruddock Review’).
11
12

Ibid [1.11]-[1.13]

In relation to the ACT see also Julie Dodds-Streeton and Jack O’Connor, ‘Analysis Report: Implementation of
Royal Commission Into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse Recommendations Regarding the
Reporting of Child Sexual Abuse with Implications for the Confessional Seal’ (Report, 2019) [170].

2

Because of the role of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) in applying the
ICCPR its decisions in individual communications and its statements in general comments are
relevant to the obligations already assumed by Australia, and are briefly considered below.
Whilst many of the Articles of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (the Convention) are in similar form to those in the ICCPR 13 Australia
is not party to the Convention. Some decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) are influential (particularly those which result in a decision of violation) but the
principles it applies differ from those followed by the UNHRC, particularly where the ECHR
reaches a decision that there is not a violation after applying a ‘margin of appreciation.’ 14 As a
result Convention decisions which have applied the margin of appreciation as part of their
reasoning to find no violation of the Convention are not considered in this paper. 15
I.

WHAT ARTICLES 18, 19 AND 21 PROTECT AND THE MEANING OF
‘NECESSARY’

Article 18

13

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4
November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) art 9 provides: ‘1. Everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order,
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’
14
Compare for example the ECHR finding that Ireland’s then proscription of abortion was not a violation of the
Convention in A, B and C v Ireland (European Court of Human Rights, Grand Chamber, Application
No.25579/05, 16 December 2010) with the UNHRC findings of breach of the ICCPR in Human Rights
Committee, Views: Communication No 2324/2013, 116th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (31 March
2016) (‘Mellet v Ireland’); Human Rights Committee, Views: Communication No2425/2104, 119th sess, UN
Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 (17 March 2017) (‘Whelan v Ireland’) of no violation. In the context of Article
18 of the ICCPR and Article 9 of the Convention see Stephanie Berry, ‘A good faith interpretation of the right to
manifest religion? The diverging approaches of the European Court of Human Rights and the UN Human Rights
Committee’ 37 (2017) Legal Studies 4, 672-694.
15

For recent Convention cases dealing with restrictions on communications around an abortion clinic see Annen
v Germany (ECHR, Application No 3690/10, 26 November 2015 (discussed in Article 19 below) and Dulgheriu
v Ealing LBC [2018] EWHC 1667 (Admin) (from which an appeal is pending) (which applying the margin of
appreciation found the relevant orders to be valid). A summary of these cases appears in Clubb v Edwards (n 2)
[204]-[205].

3

Article 18 protects the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and the
manifestation of religion. As the UNHRC has observed that freedom extends to worship,
observance, practice and teaching and ‘encompasses a broad range of acts.’ 16 In particular
‘worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as
various practices integral to such acts, including…the use of ritual formulae and objects.’ 17 The
Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has made the case that practice for the
purposes of Article 18 should be interpreted broadly. 18
Article 18.3
Article 18.3 permits some limits on the manifestation of religion but only ‘as are prescribed by
law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals or fundamental rights
and freedoms of others.’ The term ‘necessary’ means ‘unable to be done without or dispensed
with’ to take the Macquarie Dictionary definition. 19 For a restriction to be necessary is a high
bar. 20 The UNHRC has observed that:
To be permissible under Article 18.3] [l]imitations imposed must be established by law and must not be
applied in a manner that would vitiate the rights guaranteed in article 18. The Committee observes that
paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly interpreted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified
there, even if they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the Covenant, such as
national security. Limitations may be applied only for those purposes for which they were prescribed and
must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they were predicted. Restrictions
may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner. 21

16

United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion (Art 18), 48th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/Rev.1/Add.4 (30 July 1993) [4] (‘General Comment
No. 22’).

17

Ibid.

18

Heiner Bielefeldt, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, UN Doc A/68/290
(7 August 2013) [62].
19

The Pocket Macquarie Dictionary (2nd ed, 1989) ‘necessary’.

20

Bielefeldt (n 18) [30],[46].

21

General Comment No. 22 (n 16) [8] (emphasis added).

4

The Special Rapporteur has argued that states must look at alternative means of achieving their
objectives to avoid or minimise interference with religious freedom applying the principle of
proportionality. As he put it:
Under the principle of proportionality, States have always to look for less far-reaching and less intrusive
restrictions before issuing legislation that infringes on freedom of religion or belief. Another part of the
proportionality test concerns the question of whether limitations are actually conducive to the
legitimate purpose they are supposed to foster. It may happen that measures do not only fail to serve
the said purposes, they may actually worsen the situation of many individuals, particularly women,
for instance by further restricting their spaces of personal movement and infringing their rights to education
and participation in public life. 22

In the Special Rapporteur’s view steps to restrict the free exercise of religion must ‘be the least
restrictive among all the adequate measures that could possibly be applied and, in any case,
without vitiating the right itself.’ 23 This approach is consistent with the non-binding Siracusa
Principles which the Ruddock Review recommended that all Australian governments have
regard to when drafting laws interfering with freedom of religion. 24 These Principles require
states applying a limitation to ‘use no more restrictive means than are required for the purpose
of the achievement of the purpose of the limitation.’ 25 It is crucial that restrictive measures
which interfere with religious freedom not be imposed, as the Special Rapporteur says that they
sometimes are, ‘in a rather loose way’ and beyond the confines of Article 18.3 or based on
mere conjectures.’ 26 As he puts it:
[W]hen States wish to impose restrictions they always bear the burden of proof, both at the level of
empirical evidence and at the level of normative reasoning. Furthermore, for limitations to be legitimate,
they must meet all criteria set out in article 18, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant. Accordingly,
limitations must be legally prescribed and they must be clearly needed to pursue a legitimate aim, the
protection of “public safety, order, health or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. In

22

Bielefeldt (n 18) [50] (emphasis added).

23
Ruddock Review (n 10) [1.56], quoting Ahmed Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of
religion and belief, UN Doc A/HRC/34/50 (17 January 2017) [11].
24

Ruddock Review (n 10) see Recommendation 2, 1.

25

Ruddock Review (n 10) 29 [1.60], quoted in United Nations Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa
Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (28 September 1984) [10].
26

5

Bielefeldt (n 18) [31], [47]

addition restrictions must remain within the realm of proportionality which, inter alia, means they must be
limited to a minimum of interference. 27

Articles 19 and 21
Religion can be an inspiration for many acts including communicating a particular point of
view on a contentious moral issue and peaceful demonstrations. Those actions may attract the
protection not only of Article 18 of the ICCPR but also of Articles 19 and 21. Like religious
freedom the scope for states to restrict the rights guaranteed by these articles is to be interpreted
strictly as the examples mentioned below demonstrate.
Article 19
Whilst as noted earlier, the application of the margin of appreciation in ECHR cases which find
no violation makes such cases unreliable authorities in the application of the ICCPR. ECHR
cases which do find a violation and are not determined by the application of the margin of
appreciation are worthy of consideration in the context of the ICCPR. An example is the ECHR
decision in Annen from 2015. In this case the ECHR found Germany had contravened Article
10 of the Convention. This is in the same form as Article 19 of the ICCPR.28 The state’s breach
was the issuance and maintenance of an injunction. This prevented the distribution of antiabortion leaflets outside an abortion clinic and in the letterboxes of those living nearby and also
prevented the operation of a website which included an address list of ‘abortion doctors.’ 29 The
leaflets were not mild in tone comparing abortion to the Holocaust. 30 The ECHR emphasised
the public interest and the ‘acute sensitivity of the moral and ethical issues’ about abortion. 31
It found that the presentation of the arguments and the inclusion of the doctors’ names and

27

Ibid [48] (references omitted) (emphasis added).

28

Annen v Germany (European Court of Human Rights, Application No 3690/10, 26 November 2015) [65], [74].

29

Ibid [6]-[12], [74].

30

Ibid [11].

31

Ibid [62].

6

professional addresses and the distribution of the leaflets in the immediate vicinity of the clinic
enhanced the effectiveness of the complainant’s campaign against abortion. 32
Article 21
In 2013 the UNHRC found that a decision of the Central Administrative District of Moscow to
prohibit a peaceful picket outside the Iranian Embassy aimed at focusing attention on the
treatment of same sex attracted persons in Iran was a violation of Article 21. In this case the
UNHRC observed that:
[T]he freedom of assembly protects demonstrations promoting ideas that may be regarded as annoying or
offensive by others and that in such cases States parties have a duty to protect those participating in a
demonstration in the exercise of their rights against violence by others. [The Committee] also notes that
an unspecified and general risk of a violent counter-demonstration or the mere possibility that the
authorities would be unable to prevent or neutralize such violence is not sufficient to ban a demonstration. 33

More recently the UNHRC observed that:
[T]he Committee recalls that the right of peaceful assembly, as guaranteed under article 21 of the Covenant,
is a fundamental human right that is essential for the public expression of an individual’s views and
opinions and indispensable in a democratic society. This right entails the possibility of organizing and
participating in a peaceful assembly, including a stationary assembly (such as a picket) in a public location.
The organizers of an assembly generally have the right to choose a location within sight and sound of their
target audience and no restriction to this right is permissible unless if it is (a) imposed in conformity with
the law; and (b) necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order, protection of public health or morals or protection of the rights and freedoms of others. When
a State party imposes restrictions with the aim of reconciling an individual’s right to assembly and the
aforementioned interests of general concern, it should be guided by the objective of facilitating the right,
rather than seeking unnecessary or disproportionate limitations to it. The State party is thus under the
obligation to justify the limitation of the right protected by article 21 of the Covenant. 34

II. THE RELIGIOUS IMPULSE AND EXCLUSION ZONES IN AUSTRALIA
Discussing the various arguments in relation to the issue of abortion is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is sufficient to note that in Australia after several Court judgments liberalising the

32
33

Ibid.

Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1873/2009, 109th sess, UN Doc CCCPR C/109/D/1873/2009 (5
November 2013) [9.6] (‘Alekseev v Russian Federation’).
34
Human Rights Committee, Communication No 2190/2012, 122nd sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/122/D/2190/2012 (4
April 2018) [8.5] (‘Sudalenko and Poplavny v Belarus’).

7

operation of then criminal proscriptions on abortion to permit lawful abortions in a range of
circumstances, there has been a trend towards de-criminalisation of the procedure. This has
now taken place in every state and territory except New South Wales and South Australia where
abortion is widely available and illegal only in certain prescribed circumstances. 35 There is
significant pressure for de-criminalisation in those two states. Requiring these reforms, if
necessary through use of the grants power, is a campaign promise of the Australian Labor Party
in the 2019 Federal elections. 36 Whilst some consider abortion to be a ‘simple and safe medical
procedure, forming an essential part of reproductive health care services’ 37 and that embryos
and foetuses are ‘parasitic to a woman’s body’ 38 not everyone shares these views. As then
Chief Justice Kirby of the New South Wales’ Court of Appeal observed in 1995:
Some, for reasons of religious instruction or personal conscience, could not conceive of any
circumstances where termination would be necessary or proportionate. 39

Explaining the theological grounding of such religious views in any detail is similarly beyond
the scope of this paper. Mr Graham Preston and Mrs Penny Stallard were successfully
prosecuted for breaching the exclusion zone in Hobart. The Tasmanian Constitution contains
protections for religious freedom. 40 This is unique in an Australian context and meant that the

35

Tasmania, Victoria, Western Australia. Queensland, the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory
have all decriminalised abortion.

36

Amy Greenbank, ‘Labor promises free abortions, pushes to decriminalise procedure in federal election pitch’,
ABC News (Web Page, 6 March 2019) < https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-03-06/labor-promises-free-abortionsif-it-wins-government-at-election/10873612>.
37

Louise Anne Keogh et al, ‘Conscientious objection to abortion, the law and its implementation in Victoria,
Australia: perspectives of abortion service providers’ (2019) 20 BMC Medical Ethics 11, 1; see also Angela J
Dawson et al, ‘Medical termination of pregnancy in general practice in Australia: a descriptive-interpretive
qualitative study’ (2017) 14 Reproductive Health 39; Anuradha Kumar et al, ‘Conceptualising abortion stigma’
(2009) 11(6) Culture Health Sexuality 625, 633; Alexandra Humphries, ‘Abortion, Stigma & Anxiety’ LLM
Thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2011) 2.
38

Michele Goodwin, ‘If Embryos and Fetesus Have Rights’ (2017) 11(2) Law and Ethics of Human Rights 189.

39

CES v Superclinics (Australia) Pty Ltd (1995) 38 NSWLR 47, 66.

40

Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) s 46(1) ‘Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practice of religion are,
subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen. (2) No person shall be subject to any disability,
or be required to take any oath on account of his religion or religious belief and no religious test shall be imposed
in respect of the appointment to or holding of any public office.’

8

religious motivations of Mr Preston and his co-accused were relevant in the case. The
Magistrate’s findings about their Christian beliefs provide two examples of Christian views
which will suffice for present purposes:
[Mr Preston] has been a Christian since he was 14 and he believes that human life has been created in the
image of God uniquely and that human life is of absolute importance as referred to in the Scriptures. That
God knows us even when we are growing in our mother’s womb and in particular he believes in the
incarnation of Jesus as God coming into the world born in his mother’s womb and that that validates human
life at every stage. 41
Essentially as I understood Mrs Stallard’s evidence she regards herself as a practicing Christian, and as
part of her Christian beliefs she believes that every life is sacred. 42

III. AUSTRALIAN EXCLUSION ZONES AND ARTICLES 18, 19 AND 21
Whilst there are differences in the language used in exclusion zone legislation each shares teh
common objectives of ensuring that respect is given to ‘the entitlement of people to access’
such services. 43 The objects are also to ensure that employees and others coming or going from
such premises, can do so ‘without interference, and in a manner that protects their safety and
well-being and respects their privacy and dignity.’ 44 Prohibited activities include actions
which, in most places, would have been illegal under other general legislation such as
harassment, intimidation, besetting, threatening, hindering or obstructing persons attempting
to access such places. 45 There have been successful prosecutions for breach of exclusion zones

41

Police v Preston and Stallard [2016] TASMC (27 July 2016) [58].

42

Ibid [65].

43

Safe Access Act (n 7) s 98B.

44

Ibid s 98B; Queensland Law Reform Commission, ‘Review of Termination of Pregnancy Laws Consultation
Paper’(Consultation Paper, No 76, December 2017) [248] (‘Queensland Law Reform Commission’).
45
For example Safe Access Act (n 7) s 98C(1). The relevant offences for such behaviour extant prior to the
introduction of this Act are discussed by Alister Henskens, New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative
Assemble, 7 June 2017 (Alister Henskens); see also Queensland Law Reform Commission (n 53) [248]. See also
the 2017 prosecution of an anti-abortion protester for displaying an offensive image Fraser v County Court of
Victoria [2017] VSC 83 (21 March 2017) contrary to s 17(1)(b) of the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic).

9

in Tasmania, 46 Victoria 47 and Queensland 48 and an unsuccessful prosecution under the ACT
legislation. 49 Each involved peaceful, non-violent behaviour. All those prosecuted have been
Christians motivated to act as they did by their religious faith. 50 For example, the Magistrate
summed up the religious motivations of Mr Preston and Mrs Stallard in this way:
Mr Preston explained that the Bible teaches people to care for one another and in particular to help those
who are most vulnerable or defenceless. He considers that a child in the womb would be probably the most
vulnerable category of human beings and that they are completely defenceless. He believes that it is right
and necessary that people come to the aid of those who are vulnerable and defenceless which includes
unborn children. 51
[Mrs Stallard believes] that an unborn life does not have a voice, and that as part of her Christian beliefs
she needs to stand up for people without a voice which led her to protest with Mr Preston. 52

No cases have involved harassment, intimidation, besetting, threatening, hindering, obstructing
or filming persons attempting to access abortion clinics. 53 This paper is not concerned with
such acts and it does not argue that restrictions on them would be impermissible under Articles
18.3 19.3 or 21. 54 Whilst there are some variations in the language used everywhere such
legislation has been passed, it criminalises certain communications and imposes substantial

46

Edith Bevin ‘Anti-abortion campaigner Graeme Preston arrested again for protesting outside clinic’ ABC News
(Web Page, 14 April 2015) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-04-14/anti-abortion-campaigner-graeme-prestonarrested/6392214>.
47

Alyce Edwards v Kathleen Clubb (2017) MCV (23 December 2017).

48

Lydia Lynch, ‘“The law itself is a crime’: Abortion protesters refuse to plead guilty” (Web Page, 28
December 2018) Brisbane Times <https://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/national/queensland/the-law-itself-is-acrime-abortion-protesters-refuse-to-plead-guilty-20181228-p50oo8.html>; Nicole Pierre, ‘Magistrate chides
serial anti-abortion protester’ Courier Mail (14 March 2019).
49

Bluett v Popplewell [2018] ACTMC 2 (9 March 2018) (‘Bluett v Popplewell’).

50

Police v Preston and Stallard [2016] TASMC (27 July 2016) [58]; Tom Minear, ‘Mother of 13 arrested in East
Melbourne clinic protest’ Herald Sun (Web Page, 4 August 2016) <https://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/laworder/mother-of-13-arrested-in-east-melbourne-clinicprotest/newsstory/a90d71765491cd1189348579a4f98a0b>; Pierre (n 48).
51

Police v Preston and Stallard [2016] TASMC (27 July 2016) [58] (‘Police v Preston’).

52

Ibid [65].

53

Ibid [5]. Note though that Ms Heald gave evidence that ‘she felt quite intimidated, uncomfortable and
reconsidered entering the [relevant clinic]’ seeing Mr Preston holding a placard with a picture of a foetus at 8
weeks and holding some leaflets but instead confronted him.
54

For example Safe Access Act (n 7) s 98E. i

10

penalties for breach. 55 For example, in New South Wales a first offence attracts a maximum
penalty of a $5500 fine or 6 months imprisonment and a second or subsequent offence twice
that maximum penalty. 56 These penalties arise if a person, other than an employee or service
provider to the relevant clinic, communicates in relation to abortion within the designated zone
by any means which can be seen or heard by anyone coming or going from the premises if that
communication ‘is reasonably likely to cause distress or anxiety to any such person.’57
Virtually any communication or protest about abortion is likely to have this effect. 58 The
designated zone in most jurisdictions is the same as that in Tasmania. It covers 70,000m2
around every clinic in that jurisdiction. 59 It is clear from the parliamentary discussions that,
among other things, these provisions were intended to prevent public prayer and to prevent
people, sometimes described as ‘sidewalk counsellors’ providing information about
alternatives to abortion within the designated zone. 60 For example in the second reading speech,
in support of the exclusion zone legislation in Tasmania, Minister Michelle O’Byrne observed
that
[I]t will stop the silent protests outside termination clinics that purport to be a vigil of sorts or a peaceful
protest but which, by their very location, are undoubtedly an expression of disapproval. 61In the second
reading debate of the New South Wales’ legislation the Member for Maitland, Jenny Aitchison said:
I understand that there are people in this place of all faiths. I grew up in the Catholic Church. However, if
someone approached me and told me that they were praying for me in a way that suggested I was doing
the wrong thing and in an attempt to persuade me to change my mind, I would see it as an appalling affront

55

Ibid s 98D.

56

Ibid s 98D(2).

57

Ibid s 98D; Under the Northern Territory legislation any intentional act that could be seen or heard in the vicinity
of an abortion clinic ‘that may result’ in deterring a person from having or performing a termination is prohibited:
Pregnancy Law Reform Act 2017 (NT) s 14.

58

Clubb v Edwards (n 2) [303].

59

Ibid [508].

60

Ibid [164], [171], [475].

61

Greg Walsh, ‘The Constitutionality of Communication Prohibitions Around Abortion Clinics’ (2018) 9 The
Western Australian Jurist 84, quoting Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 16 April 2013
(Michelle O’Byrne).
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and assault. It is not physical, sexual or emotional assault: it is an assault on my faith. And it is completely
wrong. 62

The fact that the ACT case against three Christians engaged in silent and individual praying
including one praying the Catholic rosary using ritual formulae and rosary beads was
unsuccessful does not alter the intention of such legislation to prohibit public prayer. These
prosecutions failed because each of the Christians who were praying did so in a manner which
attracted no attention and so was found not to amount to a communication. The judgment leaves
open the possibility that praying in a manner sufficiently visible to others might offend the
legislation. 63 The intention to prohibit sidewalk counselling is also clear from the reading
speeches. For example in the second reading speech of the New South Wales’ legislation the
Member for Port Macquarie, Leslie Williams said:
I understand that the self-appointed sidewalk counsellors referred to may engage in this activity with the
best intentions, believing that they are providing advice in the best interests of the woman. However they
are untrained and they are unqualified and are clearly providing counsel with a predetermined outcome –
that is stopping women having an abortion. They are ignorant of the woman’s circumstances and
background and indiscriminate when it comes to who they target with their views and their intimidating
behaviour. Their behaviour is abhorrent, it is unacceptable and for those women who endure it highly
distressing. Today we can put an end to this behaviour. 64

In the same parliamentary sitting the Member of Riverstone, Kevin Connelly who was critical
of the Bill, made this observation:
Clearly there are standards of acceptable behaviour in the community which should be enforced and which
the existing law is there to enforce. But why should silent prayer, a silent protest with a single sign, the
offer of conversation or help if somebody wants it be criminal? Yet that is what this bill quite explicitly
proposes. 65

62

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 June 2018, 3 (Jenny Aitchison)
(‘Parliamentary Debates, Jenny Aitchison’).
63
Bluett v Popplewell (n 58) [80]-[82], [84]-[86]. See also discussion in Clubb v Edwards (n 7) [164], [171],
[475].
64

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 June 2018, 1 (Leslie Williams)
(‘Parliamentary Debates, Leslie Williams’).
65

New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 7 June 2018, 39 (Kevin Connolly)
(‘Parliamentary Debates, Kevin Connolly’).
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As noted in I above, the Special Rapporteur has stressed the importance of empirical evidence
to support restrictions on religious freedom in reliance on Article 18.3. 66 The parliamentary
debates which took place in relation to the introduction of exclusion zones in Australia contain
very little reference to empirical evidence. Much of the material relied upon is anecdotal or
hearsay. Some parliamentarians referred to what they or other parliamentarians had been told
by people accessing clinics and by workers in clinics. 67 Some refer to submissions from
organisations and individuals. 68 The only study about the impact of protesters outside abortion
clinics referred to in any Australian parliament which has passed such legislation is an
unpublished study. It has been challenged by Turner et al on a range of grounds. 69 It was
conducted at the Fertility Control Clinic by a worker at that Clinic for a Masters’ degree (the
Humphries Study). 70 In this study 158 women who, on the same day as their initial consultation,
had their pregnancies terminated at less than 12 weeks at that clinic completed a questionnaire
immediately before their procedure and just before they left the clinic after the procedure. 71
Rather than using non-judgmental language the questionnaire asked questions about being
‘confronted by anti-abortion protesters.’ 72 The terminology used may have skewed the
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results. 73 According to the Humphries Study 135 of the 158 participants ‘were exposed’ to ‘the
picketers.’ 74 Whilst this small study conducted at one clinic in Melbourne cannot be generalised
to other Australian clinics, its claims that its findings support initiatives to ensure that ‘women
are not exposed to picketers when accessing abortion’ 75 are themselves questionable. Whilst
78% of participants reported that abortion was ‘very much’ stigmatized by ‘the picketers’ and
71% reported that ‘allowing anti-abortion picketers to protest outside the front of the clinic
stigmatizes abortion ‘very much’ 76 there was only a small correlation between more exposure
to ‘anti-abortion picketers’ entering the clinic and higher levels of anxiety pre-abortion. As a
result, in this study, exposure to picketers was found not to be a significant predictor of preabortion anxiety. 77
Whilst proponents and parliamentary supporters of exclusion zones refer to them being about
protecting women’s choice, empirical evidence of the reaction of women who see or meet
people within the vicinity of abortion clinics is not uniform. Cozzarelli and Major’s study of
291 women who underwent first-trimester abortions at a large, private abortion clinic in
Buffalo, New York in 1990 found that 66% of women who encountered what they term
‘antiabortion demonstrators’ were upset to some degree but that more than a third (34%) were
not upset at all by their interaction. 78 In a study published in 1994 Cozzarelli and Major
compared post-abortion depression of women who had undergone a first trimester abortion
within thirty minutes and then three weeks after their abortion. 79 This study found that exposure
to demonstrations outside the clinic had no significant impact on depression levels three weeks

73

Turner, Garrett and McCaffrey (n 69).

74

Humphries (n 37) 21.

75

Ibid 45.

76

Ibid 35.

77

Ibid 34-35.

78

Catherine Cozzarelli and Brenda Major, ‘The Impact of Antiabortion Activities on Women Seeking Abortions’
in L J Beckman and S M Harvey, (eds) Psychology of women book series The new civil war: The psychology of
abortion (American Psychological Association, 1998) 81, 90.
79

Catherine Cozzarelli and Brenda Major, ‘The Effects of Anti-Abortion Demonstrators And Pro-Choice Escorts
on Women’s Psychological responses to Abortion’ (1994) 13(4) Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology 404.

14

after the abortion. 80 Foster et al’s study across 30 clinics in 21 US states in which 956 women
seeking abortions were interviewed between 2008 and 2010 found even more varied responses
by women who saw, heard or were stopped by protesters. 81 Almost half of the women (48%)
in this study were not upset at all by the protesters, a quarter were a little upset, 12% moderately
upset, 9% quite upset and 7% extremely upset. 82 Women in this study were interviewed again
after a week of their abortion with the study concluding that whilst interacting with protesters
can be upsetting for some it does not cause negative feelings for women who have an
abortion. 83
Among the 717 women in the study who received an abortion and replied to both the emotions and
protester questions, we found no association between emotions about the abortion – regret, relief, guilt,
happiness, sadness or anger – and the level of exposure to protesters. Compared to women who had
exposure to protesters women who reported seeing, hearing or being stopped by protesters did not have
higher or lower odds of feeling any of these six emotions. Instead difficulty deciding to have the abortion
is significantly positively associated with experiencing the negative emotions (regret, guilt, sadness and
anger) and significantly negatively associated with feeling the positive emotions (happiness and relief). 84

In a study published in 2000 Cozzarelli et al reported on a study of 442 women having firsttrimester abortions at one of three abortions clinics in Buffalo, New York in 1993. 85 Whilst
66% of women in this study agreed or strongly agreed that what it terms ‘prolife picketers’
caused psychological harm and 69% agreed or strongly agreed that the picketing should be
banned, 21% of other participants had a very different view:
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Twenty-one percent of women agreed or strongly agreed that the picketers help women by making them
think twice about abortion and 8% of women agreed or strongly agreed that the picketers were doing a
good thing by trying to discourage abortion. 86

This study found that seeing picketers and being spoken to them was not related to immediate
or long term post abortion depression. 87 Being blocked by picketers did have a small indirect
effect on immediate post-abortion depression. 88 This long-term empirical study looked at the
effects on women of interacting with people near abortion clinics when entering a clinic and
was conducted within an hour of an abortion and again after two years. It concluded that:
[E]ncountering antiabortion picketers on one’s way into an abortion clinic does not appear to pose a
significant long-term mental health risk to women who have abortions. 89

As Walsh has argued in relation to the Victorian provisions:
While banning protesters and sidewalk counsellors outside clinics eliminates any risk of causing anxiety
or distress to people seeking to enter or leave them, the weakness of the provisions is the lack of empirical
evidence that protesting activities outside Victorian abortion clinics create a serious risk to public health,
that justifies the restrictions it places on other people’s rights and freedoms and that is a proportionate
intervention. 90

Her point applies equally to all Australian jurisdictions with such zones.
Whilst the Humphries Study refers to ‘anti-abortion protesters’ and to ‘picketers’ and
Cozzarellia and Major to ‘anti abortion demonstrators’ as noted above, the actions of prayer
groups and sidewalk counsellors are also now likely to be illegal in Australian exclusion zones.
Christian prayer is a form of popular piety and it is clearly a manifestation of religion. 91 As is
evident from the tradition of pilgrimage and of prayer at sites of tragedy or of historic
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significance, place can be very important to prayer. 92 Exclusion zones impact on the religious
practices of those religious persons whose ability to pray in proximity to abortion clinic is made
criminal.
Many of the politicians who voted for exclusion zones and many academics writing in relation
to abortion claim that women visiting abortion clinics have already made up their mind to
terminate their pregnancies after carefully considering all of the alternatives; but as Cozzarelli
and Major observe:
It is possible that antiabortion activities may persuade some women not to have an abortion. This is
certainly the hope and in many cases the claim of individuals who are actively opposed to abortion…It is
also possible that some women change their minds about obtaining an abortion after confronting
demonstrators outside an abortion clinic. 93

Like the Humphries Study and much of the academic writing in this area, these authors use
judgmental language to characterise the actions of those outside clinics as ‘confronting’
‘antiabortion activities.’ Chief Justice Roberts, delivering the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in the McCullen case, and finding that a 35 foot exclusion zone was
unconstitutional, described very different behaviours:
[Petitioners] attempt to engage women approaching the clinics in what they call “sidewalk counselling,”
which involves offering information and alternatives to abortion and help pursuing these options. Petitioner
Eleanor McCullen, for instance, will typically initiate a conversation this way: “Good morning, may I give
you my literature? Is there anything I can do for you? I’m available if you have any questions.” If the
woman seems receptive, McCullen will provide additional information. McCullen and the other petitioners
consider it essential to maintain a caring demeanour, a calm tone of voice and direct eye contact during
these exchanges. Such interactions, petitioners believe are a much more effective means of dissuading
women from having abortions than confrontational methods such as shouting or brandishing signs, which
in petitioners’ view tend only to antagonize their intended audience. In unrefuted testimony, petitioners
say that they have collectively persuaded hundreds of women to forego abortions. 94

Whilst in that case one of the petitioners claimed to have persuaded about 80 women not to
terminate their pregnancies, after the introduction of the exclusion zone she said that she
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reached ‘far fewer people’ than she had reached before the zone was introduced. 95 Another
petitioner estimated that 100 women had decided to continue their pregnancies after talking
with her before the exclusion zone was introduced, but none had done so since she had been
kept 35 feet away from the clinics. 96 In an Australian context, again there is no empirical
evidence of the number of women who have opted to continue their pregnancies after
discussion with those standing outside a clinic. In a case involving a claim against a Council
for allegedly failing to curtail the actions of a group called ‘Helpers of God’s Precious Infants’
the Court received evidence that the group had assisted 300 women who had opted against
abortion after interacting with their members outside the Fertility Control Clinic in
Melbourne. 97
Although not uniformly accepted in the literature, it appears that the distress for most women
associated with a decision to terminate a pregnancy peaks before and diminishes after the
procedure. 98 Some women experience psychological distress as a consequence of the
procedure. 99 There are recognised risks of such an outcome including being ambivalent about
the procedure. 100 Some women who are undergoing what Medeira describes as a consented but
unwanted abortion may be assisted by offers of support to instead continue their pregnancy
when accessing a clinic:
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Women who agree to a consented but unwanted abortion might choose differently if circumstances were
other than what they are – if they had a healthy fetus, more economic resources, greater flexibility with
employment or education, or stronger social supports to make parenthood a viable option. 101

As Turner et al observe, not all interactions with people outside an abortion clinic are unwanted
or damaging:
Individuals who attend outside abortion premises may respectfully offer aid or alternatives to women who
may be considering an abortion for reasons such as limited finances, insecure accommodation and lack of
social support.
The provision of such support may allow some women to continue their pregnancy and potentially avoid
suffering significant emotional harm from undergoing an abortion due to lack of resources. This has
particularly been the experience of one of the authors of this article, [Obstetrician and Gynecologist] Dr
McCaffrey, who has had referred to him more than 20 women who encountered individuals outside
abortion premises and accepted their offers of assistance.
In Dr McCaffrey’s experience, these women were very grateful for the assistance provided to them by the
individuals outside the abortion premises. His patients have said words to him to the following effect “But
for the man we spoke with outside the clinic, we would not have our child!”, “We view the people outside
the clinic as having given our child life” and “We continue to keep in contact with that group, and have
sent them pictures of our child to encourage them to keep doing their good work. We are so grateful to
them.” 102

IV: THE NEED FOR MORE AND BETTER EVIDENCE
All Australian exclusion zones have been introduced in the absence of relevant evidence.
Evidence of the number and location of premises around which the zones would operate was
not available. Empirical evidence of the full range of impacts on Australian women of the
behaviour of persons in the vicinity of even a small sample of such premises in Australia was
not obtained. Empirical evidence of the behaviours of persons in the vicinity of even a small
sample of such premises in Australia was not obtained. Empirical evidence of the number of
women who decide to continue their pregnancy after interactions with people outside clinics
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and of the outcomes for them and the children born as a result was not obtained. Empirical
evidence of the impact of such legislation on those prevented from carrying out what they
consider to be their religious duties to pray or to offer sidewalk counseling was not obtained.
Evidence of the potential of harm to be caused to those women who might proceed with a
termination but who would have benefitted from interactions with sidewalk counsellors was
not obtained. Such research should occur in South Australia and Western Australia where
exclusion zones have not yet been introduced, to enable consideration of the contemporary
position. Unless the existing laws are repealed in other states and territories, research there will
be limited to investigation of the historic position. These zones have been introduced despite
the empirical evidence collected in the United States discussed above and without Australian
evidence examining whether those results would also obtain here. The evidence suggests that
whilst most women do find encounters with people outside clinics to be unpleasant at the time,
a substantial proportion of women are not upset at all by these behaviours even at the time. It
also shows that some women report positive emotions to seeing ‘antiabortion picketers’ and
that women seem not to suffer serious, long term negative psychological effects from seeing
or interacting with people outside clinics.
To recognise the potential adverse impacts of exclusion zones is not to diminish the distress
that some women do experience in seeing or hearing people outside clinics. It is also not to
diminish the desirability of securing respect, privacy and dignity for clients and staff of such
clinics which are less empirically measurable objectives of exclusion zones. However, these
objectives need to be weighed against the impact of such zones on the manifestation of religious
belief, freedom of speech and association of those prohibited from praying or from providing
sidewalk counselling in the zones. They must also be weighed against the adverse impact such
zones may have on those women whose right to access acutely relevant information is
diminished, in particular of the alternatives available to them. Particularly concerning is the
effect on those women experiencing uncertainties and other indicators of potential future
psychological distress should they undergo a consented but regretted termination. The fact that
some women – and it may be a very small minority - have decided to continue their pregnancy
and feel that decision was the right one after having access to sidewalk counsellors, suggests
that exclusion zones may operate harmfully to others, to deprive them of information about
other options and assistance available. This would appear to be so unless those working within
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the clinics are aware of and offer to their clients the range of medical and financial assistance
to which sidewalk counsellors have access.
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As Turner et al observe:

Any comprehensive assessment of the impact of any conduct needs to take into account both the potential
harm and benefit in order for an informed decision to be reached. 104
Whilst some emotional impact can be expected from any protest or sensitive issue the empirical evidence
does not establish impacts greater than might be expected from any protest of discussion of other
controversial social issues. 105

V. CONCLUSION
It may be argued that the exclusion zones which have now been introduced in most states and
territories of Australia go well beyond the range of restriction permitted under Articles 18, 20
and 21 of the ICCPR. They clearly impinge on freedom of expression and the right of peaceful
assembly. They also impinge on the right of access to highly relevant information by the
women who might choose not to proceed with the termination and might benefit from that
choice. In each applicable jurisdiction these zones prohibit a wide range of behaviours over a
substantial territory around every clinic based on very limited Australian empirical evidence.
Given the clear intention of the legislatures to criminalise prayer as part of the prohibited
behaviour and the fact that only Christians have been prosecuted to date, despite the language
used in the legislation which is neutral and general on its face, it seems clear that the laws have
a disproportionate impact on Christians. It is arguable that, at least in their application to
prayers, these laws were imposed for discriminatory purposes or that they are discriminatory
in their effect. 106
The state of the empirical evidence is such that it is at least arguable that no Australian
parliament has established that exclusion zone legislation operating over a 70,000m2 area
around every clinic in that territory is ‘necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or
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morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others’ and that it therefore falls outside the
exception permitted by Articles 18.3 of the ICCPR and (in similar terms) Article 21. It is
similarly arguable that these laws pay inadequate regard to the impact that they have on those
seeking to act in accordance with their religious faith and on the freedom of expression and the
right of peaceful assembly. Any claim to ‘necessity’ is therefore speculative.
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